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The Securitization of International Peacebuilding 
Stefanie Kappler 
Durham University 
 
Abstract: 
After the often-proclaimed ‘death’ of the ontologies of liberal peacebuilding, its associated 
ideas seem to increasingly discursively translate into a security framework. This can be read 
as an attempt of the main agents of international peacebuilding to ensure the survival of their 
approaches, institutions and infrastructures through a new framing of the concept. At the 
same time, this new framing of peace-related ideas has come to redefine ‘peace’ as 
‘security’, however not necessarily for the intervened upon, but instead for its own agents 
and agenda-setters. Against this background, this chapter investigates the agents of 
securitised peacebuilding and argues that the question ‘Whose peace?’ (Pugh et al, 2008) 
can increasingly be read as ‘Whose security?’. In that sense, the chapter suggests that peace 
has come to represent a concern regarding the security of the dominant actors in the 
international system. The chapter thus asks: a) who has the power to frame peace as security, 
b) how are these agents reframing peacebuilding and c) what does the merging of the 
peacebuilding and securitisation agenda mean for the ownership of peace, both locally and 
globally.  
 
 
Introduction 
‘State failure’, ‘state fragility’, ‘instability’ and similar words in this semantic group seem to 
increasingly have come to characterise the language of recent peace-related interventions. 
International players (such as the European Union, the United Nations, International 
Financial Institutions) have, at least in discursive terms, not given up on their ambitions to 
intervene in the name of peace and peacebuilding. Much in contrast, recent interventions 
seem to take place in a more robust and decisive manner. Examples are numerous, including 
recent debates around the intervention in Libya, contested ambitions in Syria, the role of the 
United States and Western Europe in Ukraine, and so forth. However, what becomes obvious 
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in this context is the discursive reconfiguration of peacebuilding to include security-related 
aspects. Indeed, the implementation of peacebuilding through security-centred languages and 
policies points to a larger image of political networking, during the course of which two 
semantic fields are combined in one frame. In this chapter, I argue that this framing facilitates 
the survival of liberal peacebuilding, which has recently been seen as undergoing a deep 
crisis. This is not to draw a strawman of ‘liberal peacebuilding’, which is a concept hard to 
grasp in practice, but instead to problematise its discursive framing as a legitimate policy of 
intervention as promoted by its securitisation.  
Against this background, this chapter raises the question as to why the discursive reframing 
of ‘peacebuilding for peace’ towards a framing of ‘peace through security’, or even ‘security 
over peace’ is happening, and which political networks and agendas can be seen as linked to 
this semantic shift. I argue that this shift casts light on practices of survival on the part of the 
most powerful agents and institutions in the field of peacebuilding. The chapter therefore first 
investigates the death of the notion and policies of ‘liberal peacebuilding,’ before outlining 
emerging techniques of survival through its securitisation, both in discursive and material 
terms. A brief analysis of this emerging semantic security-as-peace is framed in terms of 
‘whose security’ is at stake as well as which power inequalities are reproduced in this frame. 
This will help understand practices of securitisation, which the author recognises in the cases 
of intervention in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus. Through empirical illustrations from 
both post-conflict cases, this chapter attempts to understand a discursive shift in the 
peacebuilding field in its early stages and links it to the political interests and agendas at 
stake. It raises the question of which actors peace and security are being constructed for, and 
what this means for the quality of interventions on behalf of peace and security. 
 
 
The death of liberal peacebuilding and its critique 
Peacebuilding, as a western and highly structured model of dealing with conflict, was at its 
peak in the 1990s. It can be considered a comprehensive approach to dealing with conflict, in 
that it facilitates and engineers change not only in the political, but also the social and 
economic spheres of society, mainly through the involvement of civil society actors (Burton 
and Dukes, 1999: 144). In this context, in 1992, Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ defined 
the need “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace 
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in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (1992). On this basis, peacebuilding has increasingly 
been referred to as ‘liberal peacebuilding’, in its attempts to promote peace through tools of 
democratisation as well as its assumption that the peace being promoted is universally 
applicable and valid (cf. Howell and Pearce, 2001: 23). The liberal peace is often 
implemented through the use of civil society actors who have become key agents in the 
delivery of peacebuilding in various ways (cf. Kappler, 2014). 
The liberal peace has been said to be in major crisis, or even already dead due to the plethora 
of criticism voiced against it. In this context, Duffield (2005) has suggested that liberal 
peacebuilding is a form of bio-politics and colonialism rather than being driven by a concern 
for the common good. Easterly (2006) provides a critique against the tendencies of the west 
to impose its agenda, while Richmond refers to the liberal peace as ‘virtual peace’, which 
lacks meaning for its recipient societies (2006: 309). It has also been argued that local 
manifestations of resistance are creating an increasing challenge for the liberal peace 
(Kappler and Richmond, 2011). As a result, it is unable to survive through the use of top-
down power, but its survival is dependent on its hybridisation with local practices (Mac 
Ginty, 2011). To conclude from these approaches, liberal peacebuilding is forced to take a 
localised shape which it may not have promoted in the first place. Such discussions have been 
particularly prevalent in the case of Kosovo, where peacebuilding ambitions have partly been 
co-opted locally and local elites have been said to have derailed the ‘original’ plan of 
powerful peacebuilding elites (Franks and Richmond, 2008).  
These critiques certainly reflect a trend in the policy world, too, where increasing 
manifestations of resistance against peacebuilding, including social movements and the rise 
of new actors such as China as a peacebuilding actor, seem to threaten the mission and 
impact of the liberal peace. It also represents a threat to those actors who have invested in and 
hold a stake in the liberal peace. It affects international organisations, policy-makers, NGO 
personnel all of whom have invested massive resources in liberal peacebuilding. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina alone, the Carnegie Commission has estimated that, before 2001, “NATO 
peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts cost $53 billion” (United Nations, 2001). Kuroda 
(not dated) reports that, according to the Commission, the seven major interventions in the 
1990s (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, and El 
Salvador) cost the international community a total of $200 billion. Against the background of 
such major investments, the actors funding and implementing such missions are unlikely to 
give up on the notion of liberal peacebuilding without trying to save the mission. Indeed, in 
4 
 
the policy world, liberal peacebuilding remains a key tool of intervention despite its 
shortcomings. It almost seems as if (civil) societies have become ‘trapped in the liberal 
peace’, as Marchetti and Tocci (2015) suggest in their chapter title. In that sense, the 
continuity of established approaches has remained prevalent over the search for alternative 
responses to the critique, or even death of, liberal peacebuilding, as its critics put forward.  
Similarly, a number of academics have continued to consider the liberal peace as a necessary 
measure to bring peace and development (cf. Uvin, 2002). In line with a much more positive 
view on peace-related engagement, academics have also argued that, for instance, critiques 
against liberal peacebuilding have been exaggerated or only justified to a limited extent 
(Paris, 2010). This has certainly encountered strong resonance in the policy-world as well. 
Strauss-Kahn, then managing director of the International Monetary Fund, for instance, stated 
that “[p]eace is a necessary precondition for trade, sustained economic growth, and 
prosperity” (Strauss-Kahn, 2009). Indeed, investigating the overall approaches of 
international players such as the European Union, there does not seems to be a major policy 
shift as a result of the critiques of the last decade – a glance at the progress reports on Bosnia-
Herzegovina, for instance, does not suggest a strong transformation of the EU’s 
peacebuilding approach and instead suggests a high degree of continuity of this approach 
over time.  
Given that liberal peacebuilding has been defended, implemented and legitimised for 
decades, the critiques, or even its death, would be destructive to both policy-actors as well as 
thinkers who have invested in it and have a stake in it. The maintenance of the discourse of 
peacebuilding can instead be said to impact upon the survival of major policy actors and 
institutions. As a result, in the following section, I will argue that the agents of liberal 
peacebuilding are currently ensuring the survival of the project through an attempt to 
securitise it discursively.  
 
Framing peacebuilding as security: survival through securitisation  
This chapter suggests that the re-orientation of liberal peacebuilding can be accessed through 
an analysis of the ways in which policy actors frame it in close proximity to security 
concerns. Entman argues that to “frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
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described” (1993: 52). He adds that “[f]rames highlight some bits of information about an 
item that is the subject of communication, thereby elevating them in salience” (Entman, 
1993: 53). In that sense, framing involves the ambition to connect between events and issues 
in order to promote a particular narrative or interpretation of it (Entman, 2004: 5). Framing 
thus enhances “the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of particular aspects of 
reality” (Entman, 2004: 26).  
Framing, since Entman’s work, has gained increasing prominence as an approach to 
understanding media representations of a wide range of issues, including the wars in Iraq and 
their consequences (Entman, 2004; Garyantes and Murphy, 2010). It is, however, equally 
useful to analyse the extent to which peacebuilding has been framed as a security-relevant 
action in both academia and policy practice. I argue that the framing of peace as security has 
managed to stabilise the discourse and application of peacebuilding, and ensured its survival 
in an age where it has come under attack, both from the sites it operates in as well as 
academic debates. Therefore, the survival of the concept of peace(building) in an age in 
which it appears outdated (or even ‘dead’) has been made possible by its securitised framing. 
Securitisation is therefore, according to Balzacq, a matter of power and a  
sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, 
based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development 
(oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to 
alleviate it (Balzacq, 2005: 173).  
If we consider the practice of securitisation essentially as a practice of framing, then the 
securitisation of peacebuilding becomes an act during the course of which problem 
definitions and evaluations are highlighted in particular ways in order to suggest particular 
responses to such problems – often in the form of more robust intervention as a response to 
perceived threats. This survival mechanism of peacebuilding is therefore dependent on its 
framing as security, and the policy action following from this discursive process. Questions 
that arise through a framing analysis of liberal peacebuilding thus include: Who frames? Who 
is framed as a threat? To whom? To which political end?  
The observation of an increasing securitisation of peacebuilding is not entirely new. Newman 
(2010) has suggested earlier on that we can currently clearly witness this tendency. He 
argues, on the one hand, that “[v]iewing conflict, weak statehood and underdevelopment as a 
threat to Western interests has brought much-needed resources, aid and capacity-building to 
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conflict-prone countries in the form of international assistance” (Newman, 2010: 306). On the 
other hand, he suggests that such an approach “tends to externalize, demonize and contain 
problems in the developing - ‘other’ – world” (ibid.). In that sense, the securitisation of 
peacebuilding has led to the pathologisation of weak and failed states (Newman, 2010: 307) 
and has increased the use of top-down (rather than bottom-up) measures of international 
engagement (Newman, 2010: 317). Newman’s argument is indeed in line with Castaneda 
(2009) who suggests that security has increasingly become the driver for peace-related 
engagement, which can be considered one of the reasons for the failure of peacebuilding in 
local and national contexts. Richmond observes that prevailing conceptions of both peace and 
security can be seen as emerging from the period between 1945 and 1990 (Richmond, 2015: 
177-8), in terms of both discourses used and the threats perceived. Peace and security, as they 
are currently discussed, can therefore be considered as situated in the framework of power 
constellations of the Cold War. It comes therefore as no surprise that in contemporary 
conflicts, such as Ukraine, the commonly used rhetoric is one of Cold-War securitisation 
rather than a search for alternative and/or new mechanisms of resolution. The NATO Review 
magazine, for instance, has recently connected “[t]ransatlantic energy security and the 
Ukraine-crisis” (NATO Review magazine, not dated) and Motyl (2015) highlights the extent 
to which Ukraine is key to the security of Europe as a whole. The dominant framing seems to 
emphasise the necessity for de-escalation in Ukraine as a mechanism to create security in 
Europe, rather than facilitating peace in Ukraine. Peace thus becomes a by-product of 
security, but not its ultimate goal.  
Indeed, as becomes evident in the policy sphere, there is an increasing connection between 
peace- and security-related events and institutions in a variety of contexts. It is therefore no 
coincidence that the United Nations Security Council “has the primary responsibility for 
international peace and security” (United Nations, 2015), and other institutions have followed 
suit in terms of linking their peacebuilding activities to a security framing.  
 
The frame: Investigating the peace-security nexus  
Concepts such as security and conflict are neither pre-social nor neutral, but part of a field of 
discourses that can only be understood when their (social) context is taken into consideration 
(Campbell, 1998: 5). In that vein, a framing analysis only makes sense when the wider socio-
political and economic context in which particular frames emerge is taken into consideration. 
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A look at the discursive field of peacebuilding is therefore revealing of its increasing 
securitisation in the current political climate. 
First, we can observe the ways in which the political economy of peacebuilding is 
underpinned by a semantic framing of peace-as-security. Interestingly, in the policy world, 
we can witness an emerging discourse which calls for the need for more governance in the 
global public space as a result of the lack of peace and security (UK policy-maker and 
international diplomat, policy conference, 04/11/2014’ emphasis by the author). After having 
witnessed a number of policy debates around peace and security in the United Kingdom, I 
have realised an almost consensual notion of the need “to tackle problems early” (Senior 
DFID officer, policy conference, 04/11/2014). This suggests, that, overall, there is a tendency 
to use the peace-security nexus as an entry point for a more proactive (read: interventionist) 
approach. The combination of peace and security intelligence indeed leads to the 
strengthening of resources entering into combined conflict-security-oriented missions. 
NATO, for instance, has launched a “Science for Peace and Security Programme”, which 
aims to pool resources between the organisation and neighbouring countries. The 
programme’s attention to  
contemporary security challenges, including terrorism, defence against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents, cyber defence, energy security and environmental 
concerns, as well as human and social aspects of security, such as the implementation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) 
(NATO, 2015) 
suggests a particular focus on issues conventionally associated with security, while at the 
same time semantically privileging peace in terms of the wording of the programme. 
Similarly, the Africa-EU Partnership published a Roadmap in 2014, stating the need “to 
ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing 
fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and 
inclusive growth” (Africa-EU Partnership, 2015). This reflects the interconnection between 
the political economy of peacebuilding in terms of the resources that are pooled into such 
programmes as a result of their securitisation on the one hand, and its semantic framing on 
the other hand. 
In fact, in semantic terms, there is a plethora of examples confirming this trend focusing on 
the security, and, more specifically, the security of the west. To quote but a few frames used 
in this context: The Fund for Peace, based in Washington, famously produces the annual 
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‘Fragile States Index’ (formerly ‘Failed State Index’). The Institute for Economics and Peace 
publishes a ‘Global Terrorism Index’. In a similar vein, the Global Policy Forum (2012) 
reports that the “International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), whose members are 
primarily PMSCs, hosted a “Haiti Summit” in Florida for corporations to discuss post-
earthquake contracting opportunities”. In this context, it is also interesting to note that the 
organisation has meanwhile been rebranded as The International Stability Operations 
Association. DFID refers to its peacebuilding work in the context of its work in fragile states 
(DFID, 2005: 5). What these examples reflect is the extent to which peace is increasingly 
being securitised and broadened to include issues such as failed or failing states, terrorism or 
natural disasters. ‘Tackling instability’ becomes the key word guiding peace operations. Such 
labels are then used to discursively create a notion of ‘threat’ to peace, while linking it to the 
necessity of (foreign) intervention to tackle these issues. 
Therefore, and secondly in our investigation of the global political power relations 
underpinning this framing, Richmond (2015) suggests that peace and security have become 
‘mono-ontologies’, representing the power of the global north/west. Following this point, we 
can argue that the framing of peace as security reflects the power of the global north/west to 
legitimise intervention on a global scale through the creation of threats – to peace. In this 
vein, Kaplan’s book entitled “The Coming Anarchy” is an illustration of an academic 
discourse which problematizes insecurity and ascribes it to conflict-torn non-western 
countries (Kaplan, 2001). The lack of peace is thus viewed as a result of insecurities in the 
global south, thus, perhaps unintentionally, creating an almost orientalist binary between the 
civilised west and the dangerous ‘other’ in need of external support.  
Thirdly, in practical terms, through a rather critical lens and conducted via policy-field 
analysis, Castaneda (2009) shows how security has thus become an intrinsic part of 
peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, though this has primarily ended up stabilising the state, rather 
than problematizing its underlying assumptions. Interestingly enough, while questioning the 
concept of ‘stabilisation’ as such, Mac Ginty (2012: 27) suggests that stabilisation is always a 
matter of control and “normalizes the role of the military and aligned security agencies into 
peacebuilding.” In that respect, the language of stabilisation is a language which aims to 
maintain the status quo, which privileges certain actors over others, rather than opening a 
space for thinking about alternatives. In this case, peacebuilding has prioritised stabilisation 
over an investigation of the root causes of conflict, risking to potentially further cement 
underlying issues or even militarise ‘peacebuilding.’ Such observations encourage further 
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critical investigation of the framing of security as a peace-related mechanism, in order to 
understand the underlying political assumptions and agendas.  
However, this is not to argue that security always and necessarily equals stabilisation. Indeed, 
a continuing state of instability can even be interpreted as beneficial for the (income) security 
of certain actors, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) illustrate in their referral to the political value 
of disorder as a resource. Yet, in general terms, in line with Mac Ginty (2012), we can argue 
that the overall tendency of securitisation has been one which favours stability over disorder 
– not least as the status quo structures of liberal peacebuilding have been created by powerful 
institutions who do not necessarily have an interest in disrupting the structures they had 
created themselves. Stability has thus come to signify the cementing of the contemporary 
world order in favour of the more powerful institutions. Although not focussing on a system 
of global power asymmetries in that very same sense, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) do 
provide an analysis of the ways in which hegemonic structures are a matter of socialisation. 
Against this background, the deeply-engrained policy –focus on stabilisation can indeed be 
viewed as a result of a wider political socialisation into an assumption that the current world 
order (framed as ‘stability’) is best maintained through a focus on ‘security’. Of course, this 
then raises the question of whose security is at stake. 
 
Problematizing the frame: Whose security?  
It becomes important to take into account that, according to Rumelili (2015), security is 
always a matter of identity construction. The process of securitisation thus constitutes not 
only the identity of the ‘other’ (the threat), but also of the ‘self’ (the one to be protected). This 
is, to a certain extent, reminiscent of colonial relationships, which consisted of a process of 
‘othering’ through the representation of the ‘other’ as fixed and unchangeable to serve “the 
interests of the idealized ‘self’” (Brown, 1993: 662). In a context of peace-related 
intervention, such binarisations between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in turn lead to a conceptualisation 
of the latter as a threat to the security of the self. Security and peace as such are thus not only 
matters of concern within the society that is intervened upon, but also represent a relational 
concern for the relationship between intervener and intervened upon. This in turn has to be 
considered in the light of its possible policy-implications. What does it mean for the ways in 
which security policies are being constructed? Can the securitisation of peace be read as a 
particular framing of the relationship between self and other?  
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If we take a critical look at the frames used to legitimise intervention, often intended for 
security whilst framed as peace-related, we need to ask not only what frames are being used, 
but also for whom and for which political purpose. Mainly from a feminist perspective, it has 
been suggested that the production of knowledge is always a political undertaking (Sylvester, 
2002: 275). This raises the question of ‘whose security’ is at stake in political terms, that is, 
on behalf of whom a framing is developed and used. Such an analysis points us towards a 
system of global inequalities (such as gender and the north-south divide), which is in turn 
reproduced in the framing of peacebuilding as well.   
Interestingly enough, discussions around the nature of peacebuilding and security can be said 
to have a gender component. I can give an illustration from a high-profile conference I 
attended in 2014 on issues related to conflict and security. Populated with a mixture of well-
established academics and policy-makers alike, less than a third of the speakers were female. 
This confirms evidence from some wider studies, particularly on the marginalisation of 
women from academia and science more generally (cf. Isbell et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2014). 
Hence, if we take for granted the assumption that the ways in which knowledge is constructed 
has an impact upon the ‘real world’, then we need to reflect on the implications of 
marginalising women from a central academic discourse (cf. Sjoberg, 2009). In that sense, 
security is perhaps more susceptible to this practice than peace, as the former has long been a 
field populated more by male than by female scholars. The logical follow-on question to the 
securitisation of peacebuilding can therefore be the question to what extent the discursive 
transformation of the field results in a, perhaps inadvertent, further marginalisation of women 
from that field and what this means for the ontology of peace and peacebuilding. 
Charlesworth (2008: 249) points out that, while the assumption that women are more prone to 
peace than men has faced criticism in the sphere of feminist academic thought, there is 
nonetheless the notion of the ‘peaceable woman’ deeply engrained in international 
institutions. If this is indeed the case, the securitisation of the discourse of peacebuilding 
represents an attempt on behalf of institutions to impose a traditionally male frame upon what 
has long been considered a more female frame of peace – at least in the policy world.  
Moving beyond the gendered notion of framing, in looking at the ways in which the term 
‘security’ is used in policy-conferences as highlighted above, it becomes quickly evident that 
we are talking about the security of a particular part of the world – in orientalist terms, the 
security of the ‘west.’ Bilgin (2004), for instance, suggests that in security discourses about 
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the Middle East, a multiplicity of voices have been left out, while highlighting the need to 
situate discourses in particular world views rather than taking them for granted. 
This raises the question as to who frames and defines the peace-security agenda, and with 
what political interests in mind. The fact that questions of instability, conflict and state failure 
tend to be discussed in the global north, which claims to be affected least by those issues, 
brings up another query: whose peace and security are these discussions concerned with? If 
there was a concern about the security of the cases in discussions, would these debates not be 
held in these countries and at least include country representatives? 
At the policy conference outlined above, almost all speakers were from the west. This may 
well be a logistical issue, given the event took place in the United Kingdom. However, it 
reflects an interesting dynamic during the course of which western elites speak on behalf of 
the global south, which they aim to secure / securitise. All cases of conflict and insecurity 
discussed were located in the global south, albeit with almost no representatives from those 
countries. Yet this is by no means a new discovery. Indeed, as early as 1991, Ayoob (1991) 
published an article in which he questions the applicability of security concepts as devised in 
the west to Third World countries. Boas (2000) has very clearly and critically addressed this 
issue in his article on ‘security communities.’  He suggests that there is a tendency to focus 
on a state-centric, elite-driven perspective on security instead of security for the people on the 
ground (Boas, 2000). In a similar vein, Rubin (2006) suggests that the US intervention in 
Afghanistan is not necessarily accurately framed through a focus of peace- or state-building 
in the country, but rather through a lens of security for the US themselves. In that sense, we 
need to look at the agents of peace-security frames, in terms of who shapes them and to what 
end. 
Investigating the peace-security nexus from such a perspective points to the political function 
of discourse and framing. The framing of peacebuilding as security results in a discussion 
about the security of countries actively involved in peacebuilding (historically speaking, a 
rather westernised concept, too) rather than peace for the sake of those intervened upon.  In 
that sense, intervention is legitimised through its benefits for the intervener, as increased 
security for the latter. More specifically, the definitions of security tend to be framed 
stereotypically by a white, male, academic elite and their associated networks (cf. Latour, 
2005). This also means that the recipient societies are stripped of their agency to frame their 
peace-and security-related concerns on their own terms.  
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In this respect, Castaneda argues that “the focus on security limits the political imagination 
and discussions for alternatives” (Castaneda, 2009: 249). If we agree with this statement, we 
can claim that the securitisation of peace has, rather than broadened options for 
empowerment more generally, narrowed its scope of action. In that sense, the securitisation 
of peace does not necessarily empower the population in which peace is to be built (as 
suggested by the body of reconciliation and community activism literatures (cf. Lederach, 
1997; Rigby, 2001; Schaap, 2005), but instead empowers the interveners at the expense of the 
respective target society. This is made possible by the discursive framing of the ‘other’ as a 
threat to the interveners, rather than the more peace-specific framing of conflict between two 
groups of ‘others’. Trends of securitisation have instead created a distance between the 
interveners and their target societies (see also Noreen, 2004).  
 
Framing peace as security – examples from Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Let us thus turn to two examples to illustrate the extent to which the securitisation of 
peacebuilding has impacted upon policy practice.  
First, I would like to take a look at the so-called ‘Occupy-the buffer-zone-movement’ (alias 
‘bufferer movement’) in Cyprus, an off-spring of the Occupy Wall Street Movement that 
started in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, in 2011. The movement used the buffer-zone, that is, 
the UN-controlled zone which divides the city into the Turkish North and the Greek South, as 
a space of resistance against the UN-dominated peace process. The latter had led to the 
division of the city, and the island as a whole, in the first place. The activists of the 
movement first arranged weekly meetings in the buffer zone until some of them started 
camping permanently in the zone to voice their discontent with the politics of a divided 
island. Interestingly, the activists were from both the north and the south, and their clear goal 
was to call for the unification of the island. One of their slogans was “from UN-controlled to 
UNCONTROLLED.” 
This movement is a highly relevant example of the securitisation of peacebuilding by 
international actors who are active in Cyprus, most notably the United Nations (leading the 
peacekeeping mission) and the European Union. While one would perhaps have expected a 
certain degree of enthusiasm for this peace movement on the part of the international actors 
present on the island, it came as a surprise that, in reality, international actors watched the 
movement with suspicion. As one of the key activists reported, the movement soon received 
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an eviction letter from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (personal 
interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014). This was coupled with a visit from both the UNDP and the 
European Commission, who tried to reduce the space of the campers in the buffer zone and 
the movement as a whole (ibid.). Part of the rhetoric of the international players was security-
related, referring to issues of terrorism and drugs (ibid.). Members of the movement even 
suggested that this securitised language of drug-abuse was deliberately planted so the 
movement could be evicted. As the activist explained, the movement had at the same time 
started an initiative, during the course of which peace activists were playing volleyball across 
the divide in its narrowest spot, as a way of showing their agency to overcome the division. 
However, again, the UN stopped this initiative. To quote the activist: “they can’t cope with 
natives wanting peace” and “they are scared to lose authority over peace” (personal 
interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014). This is certainly not to glorify this movement, but to point 
to an interesting dynamic: it seems as if the language of the movement, which had the 
question of unification and peace at its very heart, was sacrificed by some international actors 
who in turn securitised the issue of the movement.  
Rather than pointing to the peace-related core of the movement, they brought up the issues of 
‘drugs’ and ‘terrorism’ as a way of minimising the agency of this movement. This in turn 
created a whole new set of relationships in the discourse. Instead of addressing the division of 
the island and the international complicity in this division, the securitisation of the ‘bufferer-
movement’ served as a way to frame the movement as a security threat to the wider island 
communities  - some of which were suspicious of the movement anyway (confidential source, 
personal interview, Nicosia, 09 July 2014). This framing thus allowed for policy-action 
against the movement and considerably damaged its energy. Although some of the activists 
are still gathering today, the movement seems to have lost its initial momentum. In that 
respect, we can argue that the securitisation of the movement had served to remove its agency 
and to subvert its initial peace-related agenda. We can also observe that international agents 
quickly took over the framing of the issue as a security-related aspect. Surprisingly, the actors 
framed as threats to security were the activists themselves who had initially set out to work 
on behalf of peace. What we can therefore see is that the framing has assumed the function of 
labelling security as linked to peace, but in an adversarial way. The international actors 
involved in the case prioritised ‘security’ in their definition over the type of peace the 
activists wanted to promote. The audience of this framing were the activists themselves on 
the one hand, but the wider island on the other hand. In a way, one could argue that the 
14 
 
framing of the activists as a threat to the security of Nicosia as a whole (in terms of drugs and 
so forth) was a tool to undermine the movement and thus maintain the status quo in which 
international (not local) actors hold authority over the definition and design of peace. The 
security frame has thus become a tool of maintaining the stability of power relations in favour 
of international and at the expense of local actors. 
 
A similar process could be observed during the 2014 protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). 
The protests developed from a medium-sized movement of factory-workers in Tuzla to an 
almost country-wide movement/uprising against corruption, unemployment and for more 
social justice (see Plenum gradjana i gradjanki Sarajeva, 2014). From the movement, a 
numbers of citizens’ plenums arose, in order to discuss political issues in a bottom-up 
manner. Those plenums met regularly (some still are) to discuss and decide on political issues 
and communicate with the formal political sphere. The movement has clearly sent a wider 
message to the west, not least in terms of the ability of people to devise their own peace 
process and define its socio-political underpinnings themselves (cf. Jansen, 2014).  It is 
therefore interesting to note how quickly the movement was securitised, both by local and 
international elites as well as the international media. The Economist, for instance, wrote: 
“By February 8th the protests had spread and violence had broken out. Several government 
offices, including the presidential building in Sarajevo, were set on fire.” (The Economist, 
2014). The BBC headline on the protests read “Bosnia-Hercegovina protests break out in 
violence” (BBC, 2014). It is certainly true that, in the initial stages of the movement, some 
violence did happen. However, this was not the main message being sent from the movement, 
given that the vast majority of protesters were peaceful and small-scale incidents of violence 
were quickly contained. 
Yet, rather than being considered platforms for the construction of a truly locally owned 
process, the protests and associated plenums were viewed with suspicion at best. Not only did 
the western media view the movement with caution, but this is also true for international 
elites engaged in the Bosnian context. Valentin Inzko, the High Representative of BiH, 
nominated by the International Peace Implementation Council (PIC), even called for the 
deployment of EU-led troops as a potential response to the unrest. Inzko traced the protests to 
a less active role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR, 2014) and thus established a 
link between the protests, the associated security issues and the limited role of the 
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international community. Similar statements could be read from Wolfgang Petritsch, former 
High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Petritsch, strikingly enough, associated the 
protests with the help- and hopelessness of the Bosnian people and thus called for “the EU to 
squarely set the reform agenda” (Petritsch, 2014: 116-7). To quote directly, Petritsch said that  
[t]he EU High Representative for External and Security Affairs along with the 
Commission and the newly appointed Commissioner, Austrian “Gio” Hahn, 
whose envelope includes the European Neighbourhood Policy plus enlargement, 
will have to put the European Union’s West Balkan policy on a “political” and 
more assertive footing (Petritsch, 2014: 118).  
What this example shows is a particular securitised framing of the protests, which could 
equally have been read as the reclaiming of ownership of the peace process by Bosnians 
themselves. Instead, international actors opted for a framing of the protests as illustrative of 
the need for more European Union involvement in BiH – which would certainly be a much 
more contested issue in local discourses (cf. Kappler, 2014).  Intervention thus becomes a 
result of a securitized frame – not least against the background that international intervention 
has long been seen as a rather controversial and questionable undertaking in BiH (cf. 
Chandler, 1999; Belloni, 2007; Richmond and Franks, 2009). Very similarly to the case of 
Cyprus, it was mainly international actors, supported by national elites, who had an interest in 
maintaining this framing in which local protesters were presented as a threat to the security of 
the country as a whole. The audience of this framing transcended the local and national, even 
extending to a more global public to which the framers could ascertain the continuing need 
for intervention in order to protect Bosnian citizens from themselves. Locally owned peace 
yet again became subordinate to security. Here, this can easily be read as the stabilisation of 
engrained and asymmetrical power relations, in which, again, local communities hold very 
little power. This is not only true due to the internal political structures in BiH, but is also a 
result of the considerable degree of power that the Office of the High Representative and the 
European Union hold in the country.  
What this case reflects is the extent to which the security frame can be used to legitimise 
foreign intervention as well as acting as a survival tool for the peacebuilding project as such. 
Against the background of the multiple forms of criticism and resistance against 
peacebuilding, a concern framed as security-relevant can thus act as a response to such 
critiques and assert intervention in more powerful ways. It equally takes away agency from 
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the subjects of intervention by framing them in a context of threats rather than possibility. 
Both the movement in Nicosia and the protests in different Bosnian cities are illustrative of 
the tendency of international peacebuilding to remain suspicious of local agency and a certain 
degree of reluctance to endorse agendas which have not been developed in their discursive 
framing of international peacebuilding.  
 
Conclusion: Implications for peacebuilding 
This chapter has cast light on the political context and strategic value of the framing of 
peacebuilding in close relation to security concerns. In this framing, peace is not necessarily 
or always seen as a logical extension of security (and vice versa), but instead sometimes even 
as an obstacle to it. In terms of authorship, the semantic field of securitised peacebuilding is 
indeed predominantly occupied and discursively shaped by powerful actors who are also 
often male elites from the west. This context certainly privileges a particular type of narrative 
and frame, that is, one which is in line with the interests of those elites as far as wider power 
structures are concerned. It almost seems as if security frames have entered the peacebuilding 
field to dominate it and divert attention from the root causes of violence, and towards a focus 
on combating its symptoms. Using the examples of local activism in BiH and Cyprus, the 
chapter has highlighted the wider political context in which such politically-laden frames 
emerge, as well as the functions the latter fulfil.  
What these examples reflect is the extent to which the securitisation of peacebuilding 
prevents the interveners from addressing the root causes of resistance, conflict or unrest, and 
instead focuses attention on the legitimisation and justification of intervention. In that sense, 
peace becomes an instrument for powerful policy-makers and elites rather than a process that 
is expected to take place at local level, which should result from local agency. Local 
ownership is then only a desirable bi-product if it complies with those larger policy agendas 
(cf. Kappler and Lemay-Hebert, 2015). The illustrations from BiH and Cyprus in fact reflect 
the hesitation of intervening powers to leave the discursive and material design of 
peacebuilding to local actors. A securitised frame instead serves to weaken their authority in 
the negotiation of the content of peace(-building) and instead secures the survival of the 
currently most powerful agents in the international system. In Cyprus, international 
organisations framed the ‘bufferers’ as a security threat as a means to end the movement and 
undermine their reputation in the wider local communities. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
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framing of the protest movement as a social threat sought to weaken the movement’s 
authority in the field of peace and social justice, both of which were (and are) at the core of 
their mission. In that sense, it becomes obvious that the increasing securitisation of (liberal) 
peacebuilding is not a natural given, but a political strategy implicated in the perpetuation of 
wider political power structures. It gives the authority to act on behalf of peace to already 
powerful actors – that is, those who are in the position to publicly frame deviations from the 
model as a threat – and at the same time limits the extent to which alternative agencies can 
challenge this model. Since who can argue against security? 
This of course raises wider questions, primarily about the ethics of security understandings 
and practices (Browning and MacDonald, 2011). It also raises questions about the framing of 
different identities – that is, the identity of the intervener and the society intervened upon. In 
this context, Fierke suggests that dialogue can serve as a vehicle for the reconstruction of 
identities, thereby potentially transforming discourses and actions (Fierke, 2007: 79 and 84).  
This is certainly not an easy task: how can the identity of a framed ‘other’ as a threat be 
transformed into an identity which is at eye level with the interveners? How can the 
securitisation of peacebuilding be resisted locally? Perhaps through a de-securitisation of 
peace-related discourses? Again, this does not seem like an easy task, bearing in mind that 
Hansen has pointed to the political difficulties in de-securitising discourses, which also 
results in the dissolution of the friend-enemy dichotomy (Hansen, 2012). At the same time, it 
is important that the power relations at play in the (re-)framing of peacebuilding and its 
recent increasing securitisation be made obvious. If they are not, we risk naturalising a 
discourse which puts security at the expense of ethics and content, rather than hand in hand 
with it. It also risks legitimising power structures which would otherwise be open to debate 
and political challenge, as the examples of BiH and Cyprus show.  
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